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It’s	in	the	EU’s	interest	for	Brexit	to	go	badly	–	but	not
too	badly
The	EU	has	good	reason	to	hope	that	Brexit	goes	badly,	writes	Paul	David	Beaumont.	This	would
continue	to	deter	Eurosceptic	parties	on	the	continent	from	hardening	their	stance.	But	at	the	same
time,	an	unambiguously	disastrous	Brexit	would	risk	depoliticising	EU	membership,	reducing	the
incentive	to	address	the	EU’s	many	flaws.
If	we	get	the	politics	we	deserve,	Britain	deserves	a	Prime	Minister	who	has	been	elected	on	the
promise	to	“get	Brexit	done”:	a	slogan	that	both	embodies	and	celebrates	unthinking	decisiveness.	Not	only	did	the
slogan	require	the	electorate	to	suspend	their	critical	faculties,	it	did	so	proudly.	Like	so	much	of	Brexit	discourse,	it
knowingly	rests	upon	what	is	at	best	a	half-truth.	Indeed,	leaving	the	EU	at	the	end	of	January	2020	will	only	be	the
beginning	of	the	UK’s	future	relationship	with	the	EU.	These	negotiations	will	likely	prove	at	least	as	long,	arduous
and	acrimonious	as	the	Withdrawal	Agreement.	Even	a	new	no	deal	cliff	edge	awaits	at	the	end	of	2020	too.	In
short,	Brexit	will	not	be	“done”:	far	from	it.
In	a	more	profound	sense,	Brexit	will	never	be	“done”.	These	last	three	years	of	omnishambles	have	had	the	side-
effect	of	producing	a	genuinely	collective	memory,	not	only	for	the	UK,	but	for	Europe	too.	In	this	respect,	Brexit	is
unusual,	because	it	has	generated	the	sort	of	continuous	international	attention	usually	reserved	for	major	wars.
While	Brits	must	endure	it	all	first	hand,	the	drumbeat	of	political	calamity	emanating	from	the	UK	frequently	makes
it	into	continental	news	bulletins	too.	Other	EU	members	have	been	watching	the	Brexit	soap	opera	unfold	with	a
mixture	of	concern,	irritation	and	amusement.	In	short,	Britain’s	Brexit	experience	has	become	that	rarest	of	things:
a	narrative	resource	for	politicians	across	Europe,	one	that	lessons	will	be	drawn	from	indefinitely.	The	question	is,
then,	what	lessons?
Theorising	the	Brexit	effect
In	a	recent	study,	I	explore	how	Brexit	has	and	will	affect	the	EU’s	ability	to	legitimate	its	existence.	I	argue	that	the
EU	requires	a	new	narrative	of	legitimation	because	the	old	narrative,	which	was	based	upon	avoiding	a	repeat
of	Europe’s	bloody	past,	is	fading	–	while	as	Brexit	showed,	conventional	cost-benefit	analysis	and	expert
warnings	may	not	cut	through	to	citizens.	Assuming	that	in	the	long	term	each	EU	member	requires	a	majority	of	its
citizens	to	support	membership,	how	can	the	EU	legitimate	itself	in	the	21st	century?
Boris	Johnson,	Credit:	Number	10	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
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Drawing	upon	emerging	trends	across	Europe,	I	argue	that	Britain,	via	Brexit,	appears	to	be	providing	a	new
narrative	of	legitimation	for	the	EU.	In	the	absence	of	rational	deliberation,	I	suggest	that	periodic	martyrdom	can
serve	as	an	unfortunate	alternative	mechanism	for	EU	legitimation.	In	short,	budding	Eurosceptics	may	require	a
periodic	public	demonstration	of	the	folly	of	exiting	to	appreciate	the	gains	from	membership.	While	the	costs	and
benefits	of	EU	membership	might	be	diffuse	while	the	given	state	is	a	member,	they	become	crystallised	and
concrete	upon	its	leaving.	The	learning	forced	upon	Britain	via	Brexit	would	therefore	become	a	public	lesson	for	all.
The	function	of	this	martyrdom	for	the	EU	lies	not	in	the	utility	of	the	sacrifice	itself	(it	will	likely	make	the	remaining
members	economically	worse	off),	but	in	its	narrative	potential	to	become	a	“usable	past”	that	“can	be	harnessed
for	some	purpose	in	the	present”.	Indeed,	Brexit	has	the	potential	to	become	a	morality	tale	that	embodies	the
dangers	of	nationalist	hubris	and	putting	faith	in	Eurosceptic	fantasies.	Certainly,	the	preliminary	evidence	suggests
the	effect	of	Brexit	has	been	to	strengthen	support	for	the	EU,	or	at	least	blunt	hard	Euroscepticism	across	the
continent.
Brexit:	from	model	to	martyr
It	did	not	always	seem	so.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	Brexit	vote,	the	reaction	across	the	continent	looked	ominous	for
the	EU.	From	Marine	Le	Pen	calling	for	“Frexit”	to	Geert	Wilders	demanding	“Nexit”,	Eurosceptics	across	the
continent	rejoiced	at	the	referendum	result.	Indeed,	commentators	began	pondering	whether	Brexit	could	become	a
model	for	other	members	to	follow	and	whether	it	would	precipitate	an	existential	crisis	for	the	EU,	or	even	‘the
West’.
Yet	as	the	Brexit	negotiations	rumbled	on,	a	remarkable	turnaround	in	Eurosceptic	trends	emerged.	Even	those
observing	from	a	distance	could	see	that	the	Eurosceptic	promises	of	“sunlit	uplands”	would	not	be	realised.	The
UK’s	attempts	to	leverage	its	economic	heft	in	order	to	Brexit	with	all	the	benefits	of	the	EU	without	the	costs	or
rules,	have	been	rendered	fantasy	(cakeism	in	British	parlance).	The	humiliation	of	Britain	during	the	negotiations
has	turned	it	into	a	laughing	stock.	Concurrently,	the	process	of	trying	and	failing	to	get	such	a	deal	has	already
turned	Brexit	into	a	“cautionary	tale”.	For	instance,	in	an	open	letter	to	his	country’s	citizens,	the	Dutch	Prime
Minister	warned	“If	anyone	[…]	thinks	Nexit	is	a	good	idea	just	look	at	England	and	see	the	enormous	damage	it
does”
If	these	snapshots	appear	anecdotal,	polling	data	and	the	changing	policy	positions	of	Eurosceptic	parties	also
indicate	a	change	is	afoot.	Once	‘hard	Eurosceptic’	parties	now	preach	remain	and	reform.	For	instance,	Italy’s	Five
Star	Movement	no	longer	campaigns	to	leave	the	Eurozone	and	Marine	Le	Pen’s	‘National	Rally’	has	gone	silent	on
Frexit.	Meanwhile,	the	Eurobarometer	polls	suggest	the	decline	in	support	for	the	EU	has	reversed.	The	2018	poll
shows	support	for	the	EU	at	its	highest	since	1983.	On	average	60%	of	citizens	believe	that	EU	membership	is	a
good	thing.	While	the	headline	of	an	EU	Parliament	News	article	reporting	on	the	poll	read	“Public	opinion	survey
finds	record	support	for	EU,	despite	Brexit	backdrop”(my	emphasis),	it	seems	more	plausible	that	this	is	the	result
of	Brexit.
In	short,	it	seems	that	Brexit	has	given	Europhiles	a	symbolic	resource	more	powerful	than	any	amount	of	economic
analysis	of	the	benefits	of	EU	membership.	From	a	Europhile	perspective,	this	may	have	happened	in	the	nick	of
time.	The	EU	needs	a	new	legitimation	narrative.	It	need	not	be	detailed;	it	just	needs	to	be	simple,	powerful	and
accurate	enough	to	be	plausible:	Do	you	really	want	your	country	to	‘do	a	Brexit’?	–	could	well	prove	apt.
EU	and	UK:	narratives	entwined
However,	the	Brexit	narrative	is	far	from	settled	and	the	type	of	exit	may	well	prove	crucial.	Indeed,	Paul	Taggart
and	Aleks	Szczerbiak	are	probably	right	that	unless	the	outcome	is	unambiguous,	its	meaning	may	well	become
muddied	as	it	is	“filtered	and	interpreted	through	the	different	narratives	of	Euroenthusiasts	and	Eurosceptics”.
Still,	what	would	need	to	happen	next	to	turn	Britain	into	a	usable	martyr	for	the	EU?	I	originally	reasoned	that	a	no-
deal	outcome	followed	by	the	dissolution	of	the	UK	might	do	it.	While	I	stand	by	this,	I	have	since	begun	to	consider
it	more	useful	to	think	about	Brexit	outcomes	and	their	effects	on	the	EU	in	terms	of	a	continuum	between	model
and	martyr	(Figure	1	–	which	is	a	new	idea	and	thus	a	work	in	progress)	where	at	each	extreme	exists	perfect
European-wide	agreement	that	Britain	either	flourished	or	suffered	because	of	Brexit,	while	in	the	middle	exist
varying	degrees	of	disagreement.
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So	far	Brexit	has	appeared	as	a	series	of	very	public	debacles,	which	has	made	Britain	seem	the	unwitting	martyr:
its	very	public	shambling	has	so	far	helped	legitimate	the	EU.	However,	the	risk	of	the	UK	becoming	a	model	has
not	entirely	receded.	The	dial	may	shift	backwards	and	forwards	with	time.	Indeed,	as	any	Brit	who	lives	abroad	can
confirm,	the	country	has	become	defined	by	Brexit	in	the	international	imagination.	Rightly	or	wrongly,	Britain’s
fortunes	seem	likely	to	become	a	bellwether	for	soft	Eurosceptics	considering	turning	hard,	and	Britain’s	fortunes
have	thus	become	inextricably	linked	to	the	EU’s.	The	better	Brexit	appears	to	go	for	the	UK,	the	more	of	an
existential	threat	Brexit	becomes	for	the	EU.	The	worse	life	after	Brexit	appears,	the	more	likely	that	Britain	will
become	a	martyr,	albeit	an	unwitting	one,	for	the	EU	cause.
Figure	1:	Continuum	of	Brexit	outcomes
Note:	Compiled	by	the	author.
The	grim	implication	is	that	the	EU	has	powerful	incentives	to	wish	its	awkward	friend	ill.	However,	it	is	not	quite	as
simple	as	that.	To	be	sure,	if	it	lets	the	UK	have	its	cake	and	eat	it	then	the	EU	will	quickly	fall	apart,	as	the	rest	of
the	bloc	seeks	the	same	deal.	Yet	if	it	is	seen	to	punish	Britain	then	the	EU	would	risk	appearing	like	a	prison	(a
Eurosceptic	trope).	The	best	option	for	the	purposes	of	EU	legitimation	–	and	the	one	that	the	EU	has	followed	so
far	–	is	to	stick	stolidly	to	its	own	rules:	offer	the	UK	no	special	privileges,	nor	any	special	punishments.	In	short,	the
UK	will	be	able	to	have	its	cake,	but	not	to	eat	it	too.
The	optimal	outcome	for	those	who	would	prefer	to	see	the	EU	reformed	rather	than	disintegrate	would	be	for	Brexit
to	appear	to	go	badly	–	but	not	so	unambiguously	that	the	Brexit	martyr	effect	depoliticises	EU	membership
altogether.	This	way,	Brexit	would	become	a	resource	for	dampening	the	more	fantastical	claims	of	hard
Eurosceptics	on	the	continent,	but	not	so	badly	that	it	makes	leaving	unthinkable	and	therefore	undebatable.	After
all,	the	EU	does	suffer	from	a	widely	documented	“democratic	deficit”,	and	if	Brexit	turns	out	to	be	an	unambiguous
disaster	it	would	reduce	the	incentive	for	the	EU	to	address	its	many,	many	institutional	flaws.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	first	appeared	on	our	sister	site,	LSE	Brexit.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of
EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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